CUSTOMIZING CONCEPTION: A SURVEY OF
PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS AND THE
RESULTING SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL DILEMMAS
One in six American couples experience difficulties conceiving a child.
With fertility rates at an all time low, the business of treating infertility is
booming. However, due to the United States prohibition on government
funding for embryonic research, the $4 billion industry of assisted
reproductive technologies (ART) has been incompletely monitored and
largely removed from oversight. Additionally, due to the fervent
abortion debate, in vitro fertilization (IVF) was introduced in the United
States without a research phase and procedures have been forced to
evolve in the private sector. Thus, the checks and balances on medical
innovation that are generally imposed by the federal government for
consumer protection are lacking. Decisions about when to go from the
laboratory to the clinic are often left solely to the discretion of private
physicians. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is just one of
many such treatments offered by these clinics. This iBrief examines how,
why, and to whom the reproductive procedure of PGD is offered. In
addition, it evaluates the prospective effects to society that arise when
PGD is used for sex selection and for nontherapeutic or enhancement
purposes. Finally, it explores whether and how to regulate PGD in the
United States by investigating approaches to policy making that have
been adopted by the United Kingdom.

The great challenge to mankind today is not only how to create, but to know when to stop
creating.
—Lord Emmanuel Jacobvitz, former chief rabbi of Britain.
Attending to her father and witnessing two siblings progressively deteriorate from the
agonizing dementia that is characteristic of Alzheimer’s disease recently led a Chicago woman in
her early thirties to vow this dreadful fate would not be passed along to her child. The patient—
who will almost certainly develop the disease by age forty—stood a 50% chance of having a child
who would inherit the genetic anomaly. This led her to a specialist at Chicago’s Reproductive
Genetics Institute, where she was introduced to the possibility of preimplantation genetic
diagnosis. Using in vitro fertilization techniques, doctors trained in reproductive medicine were
able to fertilize thirteen of her eggs in petri dishes with the father’s sperm. PGD then allowed
them to screen these embryos for the six that were free from the defect. They implanted four of
the six, which resulted in the birth of a healthy baby girl free from the fate bestowed on her

grandfather and her mother’s siblings. Although PGD has been used to screen for genetic
abnormalities for over a decade, this was the first known PGD procedure used to detect inherited
early-onset Alzheimer’s disease, which resulted in a clinical pregnancy and the birth of a child
free from the disposition.
Human genomic research has led to innovations in reproductive technologies that are
altering our attitudes towards procreation, and publicized success of cases like this will ultimately
increase the demand for access to PGD. Although most agree that screening for Alzheimer’s
disease is auspicious in itself, PGD does have the potential to open the floodgates to selecting for
a wider array of traits or essentially “customizing conception.” Presently, it is not practicable to
use PGD as a means of selecting physical characteristics, behavioral traits, or intelligence.
However, the genetic components of these expressions are being investigated, and it is only a
matter of time before technology will allow parents to select traits for their children that are most
desirable to them. The potential for impacting future generations makes this a revolution that
could be in danger of becoming a more politically sensitive matter than abortion.
Procreative autonomy or reproductive choice is often the principal argument advanced to
discourage governmental oversight.

Others believe that regulation would stifle debate and

discourage a moral consensus, or that legislation encompassing these new technologies may not
be desirable where it would “run contrary to basic human rights and freedoms.” However, the
laissez-faire approach currently practiced in the United States—while allowing for individual
agendas of reproductive choice based on religion, culture, philosophy, and wealth—leaves open
the door to eugenic practices, and could ultimately exacerbate the rift between the affluent and the
underprivileged.

Section I. Who is likely to benefit from PGD?
Catastrophic reproductive history, genetic risk and aversions to abortions are the primary
reasons specified for undertaking PGD.1 Reproductive histories of patients surveyed showed that
the majority of patients have had one or more pregnancies, yet very few of those couples have
any healthy children.2 Approximately 25% of those couples have had at least one child affected
with a serious genetic disorder, and a greater number reported spontaneous abortions or
terminations of pregnancies after an abnormality was detected through prenatal diagnosis.3
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Before the advent of PGD, testing was performed prenatally in the first trimester by using
chorionic villus sampling (a biopsy on a small sample of the placenta), ultrasound (using sound
waves to look at internal structures), or by amniocentesis (the withdrawal of amniotic fluid from
around the fetus) during the second trimester. Currently, there are more than 500 different
conditions that can be diagnosed prenatally, and this number continues to grow significantly each
year.4 These prenatal approaches, however, leave the couple faced with a decision of whether to
undergo a “genetic abortion” as late as twenty-four weeks into the pregnancy. Genetic or
therapeutic abortions often place the mother at risk and are frequently accompanied by a
tremendous amount of guilt or grief arising out of the couple’s own genetic status.
Predictive medicine, such as PGD, while attempting to prevent the passing along of
genetic susceptibilities, can also eliminate the need to abort a fetus. IVF provides access to the
egg and embryo, making it possible to examine the DNA of individual embryos. Infertile couples
using IVF, couples at risk for a genetic disease, or those who are aware that one parent is a carrier
can take advantage of the opportunity to screen their embryos for chromosomal abnormalities
prior to implantation. Electing to terminate an embryo after PGD shows an abnormality is often
an easier decision than abortion, and is less risky to the woman’s health.
Provided the parents are not hindered by their view of the moral status of the embryo,
PGD can obviate the 25% to 50% risk of passing on specific genetic abnormalities by offering
couples the opportunity to terminate in vitro derived embryos that manifest genetic abnormalities
prior to implantation. Moreover, PGD restores confidence when the embryo is healthy, and
offers diagnosis and alternatives when a severe abnormality is present. It is, therefore, natural to
see why many have elected to use this technology to avoid the possibility of abortion after
traditional prenatal diagnosis shows that the fetus has the genetic defect. If use of PGD becomes
widespread it has the potential to reduce the occurrence of many of these genetic diseases
worldwide. Due to the fact that treatments can easily cost many millions of dollars over the
lifetime of a single individual, there appears to be a substantial and justifiable interest in
preventing the occurrences of these traits by employing PGD for therapeutic screening of
embryos.

4

LORI B. ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT 23 (2001).

Section II. Arguments against using PGD to select for serious diseases
Moral status of the embryo
There are relatively few arguments against using PGD to screen for serious diseases. The
most often cited seems to be related to the moral status of the embryo. The argument centers on
the effect that screening and subsequent termination of embryos has on prenatal life. Pro-life
activists argue that life begins at fertilization, not conception. Thus, the embryos would be
entitled to the same legal protections that are afforded to individuals. Therefore, they believe that
the embryos should not be deprived of any likelihood of implantation, and that they should not be
subjected to screening that would lessen their chance of survival.5 However, the majority of
practitioners view this simply as the lesser of two evils. By allowing for screening prior to
implantation, PGD has the potential to reduce the amount of abortions that carry greater medical
and emotional consequences.

Additionally, it is argued that because embryonic cells are

nondifferentiated–often undergoing spontaneous twinning–the embryo is not clearly individual.6
Thus, it is contended no life actually taken by the termination of these preembryos.
The United Kingdom’s licensing and regulatory body for assisted reproductive
technologies, the Human Fertilization and Embryological Authority (HFEA), has taken the
position that “a collection of four or sixteen cells is so different from a full human being … that it
might quite legitimately be treated differently.”7 Consequently, they determined that the time to
be adopted for regulation of research on embryos is at the appearance of the “primitive streak” at
about day 14 or 15.8 This “primitive streak” is the visible site of invagination formed by the
interpositioning of the mesoderm with the endoderm and the ectoderm.9 This view has been held
to be consistent with the theological view of continuous creation as opposed to the infusion of a
human soul at a particular moment.

Late-onset diseases
While many genetic diseases are progressive and disabling, a late-onset disease allows
many years of good health. However, variations in penetrance can frequently generate stress and
a feeling of uncertainty. The costs of rearing a child with a late-onset disease may be financially
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and emotionally significant. Thus, the presence of a genetic disposition for a late-onset disease
may go to the heart of the couple’s decision of whether to reproduce at all. In a case where PGD
reveals a predisposition for a late-onset disease such as Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s disease, a
couple may elect to terminate those embryos that are affected. Some argue that patients suffering
from these diseases that will not manifest any symptoms for thirty to forty years should not be
allowed to terminate the affected embryos because they feel that by that time a cure may have
been developed.

The HFEA acknowledges that while the age of onset is one factor, the

seriousness of the disorder and the circumstances of the individual couple and family may be
equally relevant. They have suggested that age of onset, “should be one of a number of factors,
but not an overriding factor, in determining whether PGD should be offered.”10

Disability discrimination claim
The disability discrimination claim maintains that prenatal or preimplantation screening
for disabilities results in discrimination against those with the disability by reducing the numbers
of people affected. Moreover, they believe that by terminating the fetus or embryo we are
sending a message that a life with the disability is not worth living at all. It is also argued that
developing remedies is hindered by the ability to select against diseases either by PGD or
abortion. Millions of people who are currently affected with these disorders are living happy and
productive lives. These individuals argue that identifying people based on their circumstances
has the tendency of perceiving abnormalities as inconveniences. In addition, they believe that
“PGD and embryo selection against these traits will reinforce beliefs that they are inferior.”11
However, one commentator cautions, “it would be a drastic step in favor of equality to inflict a
higher risk of having a child with a disability on a couple (who do not want a child with a
disability) to promote social equality…. To attempt to prevent accidents which cause paraplegia
is not to say that paraplegics are less deserving of respect.”12 It is important to distinguish
between disability and persons with disabilities. Selection reduces the prevalence of the former,
but is silent with respect to the value of the latter. Consequently, we must evaluate our social
institutions and beliefs regarding the disabled, but we should not restrict the use of PGD to screen
for severe genetic disorders solely on the basis of disability rights.
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Section III. Sex selection of embryos
Historically, cultures have practiced sex selection using a variety of means from timing of
coitus to infanticide. Infanticide (a form of genetic selection where infants are often suffocated
soon after birth) has often been practiced in countries such as India and China where families
place a premium on producing a baby boy. Continued lineage and economic survival of the
family are the two principal reasons advanced for undertaking this practice. And although
selective female infanticide has been outlawed in India since 1996, the procedure is still
widespread.13
However, as prenatal screening technologies such as ultrasound, genetic diagnosis by
amniocentesis, and chorionic villus sampling have become more readily available, the practice of
infanticide has declined and many couples are choosing selective abortion as the preferred
method of ensuring the sex of their children.14 In fact, technicians in China, Taiwan, Bangladesh
and India travel from village to village with portable ultrasound devices to screen pregnant
women who pay them to discover the sex of their fetuses.15 As a result, one study conducted in
India reported that out of 8000 abortions performed, 7999 of the fetuses were females.16 Recent
developments such as prefertilization separation of X-bearing spermatozoa and PGD followed by
sex selection have the potential to eliminate theses conventional practices of “gynecide.”
Prefertilization sex selection techniques, although currently available to humans, are still
experimental and unreliable. PGD, on the other hand, has opened the doors to sex selection by
providing couples with the opportunity to screen embryos for the preferred sex before a
pregnancy is initiated. If a single piece of DNA on the Y chromosome is identified then the sex
of the embryos obtained can be determined with 85-95% accuracy.17 Nevertheless this still
provokes ethical concerns relating to the perpetuation of gender oppression, the appropriateness
of expanding control over nonessential characteristics of children, and unfair expenditure of
limited medical resources.18
In May 2001, the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(ASRM)–a group that sets fertility clinic standards nationwide–said it could be ethical for parents
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to choose their children’s sex for non-medical reasons.19 They stated that they did not feel that it
would be unethical for parents to utilize this technology to select for a child “of the gender
opposite that of an existing child or children.”20 Likewise, they acknowledged, “it would not be
unethical for parents to prefer that their first-born or only child be of a particular gender because
of the different meaning and companionship experiences that they expect to have.”21
Although the committee was referring to pre-conception sperm sorting techniques, this
statement opened the floodgates for the use of PGD for sex selection. The attitudes of some
clinicians were that if it is ethically sound to select for sex using a technique that can merely
improve the odds of gender selection, then logically it follows that it must also be acceptable to
do so using PGD, which is nearly 100% effective in determining the sex of an embryo. As a
result, CHR–one of the largest providers of fertility treatments in the United States–announced
plans to begin offering sex selection for nonmedical referrals to patients at their New York and
Chicago clinics.22 However, other commentators did not see this as a logical extension of the
endorsement on sex selection. Jeffery Kahn, who is the Director of the Center for Bioethics at the
University of Minnesota argues, “[s]orting sperm is one thing—it’s quite another to create and
test embryos before they are implanted in a woman’s womb and discard those of the “wrong”
gender, at least for many professionals and members of the public.”23
Accordingly, after an uproar from members of the public and the press, the Chairman of
the Ethics Committee John A. Robertson announced an updated opinion in a letter dated
September 17, 2001.24 In summary, the position of the committee was that clinics could ethically
offer PGD solely for sex selection if there is “good reason to think that the couple is fully
informed of the risks of the procedure, and are counseled about having unrealistic expectations
about the behavior of children of the preferred gender.”25 Shortly after, however, in a letter dated
February 7, 2002, the opinion was again revised to read “the Committee reaffirms its previous
conclusion that initiating IVF and PGD solely for non-medical gender selection, e.g., for the first
19
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child, should be discouraged. It also concludes that initiating IVF and PGD solely to create
gender variety in a family should at this time also be discouraged.”26
Although there is currently little reporting on the use of PGD for sex selection in the
United States, of the twenty-one centers that submitted data to the European Society of Human
Reproduction and Embryology (ESHRE) Consortium, fifteen reported that they were against
social sexing and only four replied that they were in favor of the procedure.27 The arguments for
social sexing other than the prevention of sex linked genetic disease include: the right to selfregulation of countries, individual rights of procreative choice, and that the elimination of
embryos of the unwanted sex is a preferred alternative to abortion.28 Couples in favor of sex
selection maintain that the choice of offspring gender is significant in their decision of whether or
not to reproduce. If this argument were accepted then their decision would presumptively be
protected as a fundamental right and could not be restricted without the showing of a compelling
state interest. This aspect of procreative autonomy is the focus of section V.
With respect to the argument that the termination of embryos of the unwanted sex is a
lesser evil than selective abortion, Jeffery Kahn responds, “[i]n the case of using in vitro
fertilization for sex selection, couples test embryos and discard those of the unwanted gender–a
process that seems to discount or even ignore the seriousness of the ethical issues it raises.”29
Therefore, if the embryo is to be given any moral status whatsoever, terminating healthy embryos
because they are of the wrong sex seems to be as immoral as it is unethical.
Other more attenuated arguments in favor of PGD for sex selection include:

that

allowing families to select embryos of the desired sex contributes to population control (these
couples will no longer be compelled to reproduce until they conceive a child of the ideal gender),
gender balancing within the family (they have one or more children of one sex and would like to
parent the other sex), and a desire for parental companionship by raising a child of the same
gender.30 The Ethics Committee of the ASRM believes that although population control is a key
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issue in many countries, the limited use of PGD and sex selection in the United States cannot be
currently justified solely on the basis of population limitation.31
Inherent gender discrimination is the primary reason advanced for prohibiting sex
selection of embryos. However, this argument seems to be more compelling when applied in
countries where gender is tied to economic independence and equal rights. Presently, there is no
data that suggests that gender discrimination practiced in the Middle East and Asia would occur if
we allowed for sex selection in the United States. Further arguments against using PGD for sex
selection other than the potential for inherent gender discrimination include: the use of medical
resources for sex selection may result in an unfair allocation of medical resources, that
inappropriate control over trivial characteristics may lead to commodification of children, and
that widespread use of sex selection may lead to an imbalance of the overall sex ratio within
society.32
The decentralized health care system in the United States makes it unlikely that couples
choosing to take advantage of PGD for sex selection will, as a result, deprive others of limited
medical resources.

However, if argued in the aggregate, these individual decisions could

ultimately have some impact on the overall allocation of medical resources. The argument
against commodification of children seems to present the strongest case against using PGD for
sex selection. As the possible list of genetic tests grow, there will be a greater temptation to
select for physical traits and behavioral characteristics. Furthermore, as more and more clinics
begin to offer PGD the relative demand for standard screening will diminish, and there is some
concern that existing clinics will begin to offer these supplementary services to remain
competitive in the marketplace.
While many commentators argue that PGD for social sexing will produce an unbalanced
sex ratio, Dr. Malpani at the Malpani Infertility Clinic in Mumbai, India, dismisses these claims
by stating that the “expense, limited availability and comparative inefficiency of sexing by
embryo biopsy” make it unlikely to significantly impact the gender ratios of any populations.33
Moreover, he recommends that in countries like India where cultural preferences for males are
great, that safeguards should be implemented to restrict PGD for sex selection to only couples
that already have a child.34 However, even before PGD became available–when the one-child
policy was being enforced in India–the sex ratio was altered to 153 males for each 100 females.35
31
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In the US, sex selection is generally sought for a third or later child of the opposite sex
than those already produced by the couple.36 One survey reported that 34% of geneticists stated
that they would perform sex selection for families seeking to have a son, and another 28% said
that they would refer the couple to a doctor who would.37 Dr. John Stephens’s clinics in
California, Washington, and New York, already offer couples the opportunity to undergo prenatal
testing for sex selection.38 Twenty-five percent of American couples surveyed have said that they
would utilize these sex selection techniques.39 And although Western societies attitudes towards
women differ significantly from other parts of the world, the demand for male offspring is still
apparent with 81% of men and 94% of women stating that they would desire to ensure their first
child was a boy.40 This survey tends to legitimize fears of a potential gender imbalance that the
ASRM’s Ethics Committee is dismissing as a “remote consequence … remaining too speculative
to place seriously in the balance of ethical assessments of the techniques.”41

Section IV. PGD used to select for nonmedical traits
Today, we may only be selecting for gender, but as the technology catches up with our
suspicions we may soon be faced with hundreds of alternatives that could fall under the rubric of
family balancing. For example, suppose that thirteen embryos have been biopsied, six are found
to be free of the specific disorder in question and the doctor is only willing to transfer four of
them (due to the health risks with multiple pregnancies). What are the criteria by which the
remaining two are terminated? Should we allow sex selection at this point, or what about
selecting for physical or behavioral preferences? “There’s a big difference between curing
infertility, on the one hand, and trying to make sure that your child inherits your curly hair on the
other,” says Princeton bioethicist and author Lee Silver.42
So then, on what basis should we ascribe impairment? Most commentators agree that
pre-natal and pre-implantation diagnosis should only be used to screen for serious disorders.43
The “best interests of the child principle” is fundamental to legislation of assisted reproductive
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technologies in Australia and the United Kingdom.44 This principle provides that the welfare and
interests of the child are paramount.

Parents are prohibited from requesting inappropriate

nontherapeutic treatments if they are contrary to the best interests of the child. On the other hand,
if two alternatives are considered to be equally viable, the parental choice will be upheld. This
approach offers protection for children who cannot help themselves versus offering protection to
those who may bear the burden of caring for them.
The English Abortion Act of 1967 provides for a lawful termination of the pregnancy if
“two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith ... that there is a
substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical symptoms or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.”45 What then should be considered to be severe?
Can some conditions be severe in some geographical locations and not in others based on climate
and treatments offered? Should parents abort a fetus that has a treatable disorder because of
expense? Severity is not always determined in the medical sense and can be accessed differently
among diverse family structures.46 Professor Silver suggests three factors to determine severity:
impact on quality of child’s health (survival suffering and limitations on function), age of onset,
and probability that genotype will influence phenotype.47
Even if these standards are applied through legislation, there remains a threat that more
and more conditions will be classified as severe as a result of pressure to get access to PGD.48
Perhaps the use of PGD could be limited by allowing couples to select only against traits that
would impair one’s “well-being.” However, selecting against traits that have the potential to limit
an individual’s well-being naturally suggests that we must select only positive traits. A positive
trait may encompass both disease and nondisease genes; thus, the line is again blurred.
When one screens multiple embryos, however, there is an inherent pressure to select only
the most desirable traits. Consequently, PGD has a far greater eugenic potential than prenatal
genetic testing. Essentially what would be screened for is a gene that predisposes some physical
or psychological state such as intelligence, height, or even musical talent.49 Although selecting
for physical and behavioral traits is not currently possible, the demand seems to exist as
evidenced by donor catalogs for artificial insemination that allow couples to select for these traits
by providing information on “ethnicity, hair color and texture, eye color, height, weight, blood
44
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type, skin tone, years of education, and occupation (or major in college).”50 The central logic
behind reform eugenics of the 1930s was that “the human race was faced with genetic
deterioration unless we actually intervened in reproductive decisions.”51 Ideas about biological
variations have been the foundation of many of the global atrocities in the past; therefore, we
should be particularly cautious of distinguishing potential humans on the basis of behavior,
personality or genetic predispositions to genetic disease.
Researchers involved in behavioral genetics are seeking to link genes to complex patterns
of behavior such as alcoholism, bipolar disorders, intelligence, and homosexuality.52 Behavioral
genetic research can be categorized as the study of “behavioral illness” (depression,
schizophrenia, Alzheimer's, and attention-deficit disorder), “deviant characteristics” (alcoholism,
criminal behaviors, and homosexuality), cognitive characteristics (reading disabilities and
intelligence), or “basic personality dispositions” (shyness, self-esteem, and social attitudes).53
However, the problem with analyzing this data is that most of these traits are apparently
polygenic and also significantly influenced by nongenetic environmental factors. Therefore,
predisposition testing has a great potential for abuse because it cannot accurately predict whether
or when these behavioral characteristics will actually express themselves.
The fear of misinterpreting or misapplying these correlations is that society may view
non-genetically influenced behavior as the product of “free will,” whereas non-genetically
influenced behavior will likely be held beyond the control of the individual.54 In fact, criminal
defense attorneys seized upon one such study published in 1993, which attempted to link the
MAOA gene with abnormal aggressive behavior, as a way by which to exculpate their clients that
were serving death row sentences.55
The principle of procreative autonomy claims that couples should be free to determine
when and how to have children, and many see selection of nonmedical traits as a logical
extension of this principle. They further support this argument by stating that if people are free to
choose whether to procreate, and if these behavioral characteristics are central to that decision,
then couples should be able to select for nonmedical traits as well. Proponents of selecting for
nondisease genes often equate their argument to selecting for disease genes by stating “it is not
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disease which is important but its impact on well-being.”56 This implies that if intelligence
affects one’s well-being then parents should select for it without regard to social inequality.
Others suggest that if we allow selection of embryos based on intelligence, physical, and
psychological traits then we will be contributing to inequality in society. These critics argue that
by selecting the best embryos we are circumventing the natural random process of evolution, and
that selecting for non-disease traits will lead to commodification of children.57 They fear that
consumer-driven parents may feel as though they paid for a perfect child and that anything less
than perfect would be unacceptable. Thus, parents might place excessive expectations on their
customized children.
While the current effects on society from the use of PGD are minute, Professor Silver
feels that in time affluent parents will have children who are less prone to disease.58 Moreover, he
believes that this effect will combine with the increased chance for success already possessed by
children raised under better environments, which will eventually lead to an even wider gap
between the “haves” and the “have nots.”59 In other words, while wealthy parents are able to
select traits for happiness, creativity and physical talents, disorders such as obesity, heart disease,
alcoholism and mental illness will be left to “drift randomly among the families of the
underclass.”60 Bioethicist, George Annas, has stated,
[t]o try to give your child a genetic head start would, I think, be
irresistible for parents who could afford to pay for it …. This could be
very problematic for society. It’s a road I don’t think we should go
down. But it’s one I could see us going down very quickly as a result of
advertising, peer pressure, and so on ... and that parents who don’t “take
advantage” of the new genetics will soon be seen as bad or even
neglectful parents.”61

Section V. Legislation of PGD
Rights-based Arguments
Arguments in favor of using PGD are generally founded on principles of procreative
autonomy. Therefore, any public attempts to regulate this technology would likely be attacked on
that basis. The Supreme Court has examined the principle of procreative autonomy associated
56

Savulescu, supra note 10, at 423.
Id.
58
SILVER, supra note 11, at 225.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
George Annas, Turning Point for the Human Species: Trial Lawyers Should Prepare for the
Brave New World of Genetic Research and Human Cloning, TRIAL 29 (2001).
57

with the right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Although the Court has never overtly acknowledged an affirmative right to procreate using IVF,
Skinner v. Oklahoma recognized, in dicta, that “marriage and procreation are basic civil rights of
man” and declared procreation to be “a fundamental right essential to the existence and survival
of the race.”62 Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Eisenstadt v. Baird, “[i]f the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”63 However, Skinner and its progeny involved only
coital reproduction, and it is uncertain whether this inferred right that stems from a right of
privacy would be applied to noncoital reproduction.
Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court held in Roe v. Wade “that
regulations limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest.”64 The
Court specifically noted the burdens of carrying, delivering and raising a child and concluded that
a mother’s interests in avoiding these burdens were significant enough to outweigh the state’s
interest of protecting the embryo.65 Therefore, it seems logical that this analysis would extend to
the decision to use PGD to select for serious medical conditions that may give rise to such
burdens, and that a standard of strict scrutiny would be applied to ensure that the state is
“pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”66 However, the
decision may be more complex because IVF separates the embryo from the womb. Therefore, if
the embryo is viewed as a separate and physically discrete unit, it may be held to have rights
independent of the mother.67 Nevertheless, this standard of strict scrutiny that the court applies
when a state attempts to regulate requires a showing of a “proximate and inherently dangerous
degree of harm.”68 If such a compelling state interest does exist, the Court has stated that the
restrictions that attempt to accomplish these interests must be narrowly tailored so as not to be
overly inclusive.69
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Supporters of prebirth selection rest their arguments on the connection between the
expected characteristics of offspring and the decision of whether or not to reproduce.70 If PGD is
used to select what is merely a preferable trait as opposed to a trait that vitally affects the decision
of whether or not to reproduce at all, then it may not be viewed within the ambit of procreative
autonomy or as a fundamental right. Thus, the state may regulate to further any rational interest.
This rational interest seems to exist where policy is based on the “best interests of the child”
principle. Using PGD for sex selection or for selecting for nonmedical traits does not deal
directly with the decision of whether an individual can reproduce, but rather it deals with the
product of their decision to reproduce. Because of the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize
new rights, these types of decisions would appear to fall outside the scope of the substantive due
process doctrines founded upon rights traditionally protected within our society.
Issues of family law have been traditionally left to the states, and most states allow the
industry to regulate itself.71 The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology calls itself a
“governmental watchdog for assisted reproductive technologies.”72 The society collects and
validates the outcomes of clinical data and requires accreditation of embryology laboratories.
Nonetheless, membership in SART is voluntary and many establishments do not subscribe. The
American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) also has formed an ethics committee that
publishes guidelines for its members, but again, membership is voluntary.
Ten states have enacted legislation that prohibits some forms of embryonic research;
however, six of those have specifically exempted PGD.73 The remaining four only allow PGD
when it can be shown that it causes no harm to the embryo and is proved to be beneficial.74
Moreover, there are no state or federal laws directly assessing the nontherapeutic use of PGD.75
Federal courts in Illinois, Louisiana, and Utah have considered the constitutionality of
embryological research prohibitions.76 The Lifchez court held that “the constitutional choices that
include the right to abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the right to submit to
a procedure designed to give information about that fetus which can then lead to a decision to
70

John A. Robertson, Preconception gender selection, AM. J. BIOETHICS 8211 (2001).
ROBERT LEE, & DEREK MORGAN, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN FERTILISATION AND
EMBRYOLOGY ACT 1990 287 (1991).
72
Phil McNamme, What does SART do anyway?, at http://www.sart.org/.
73
June Coleman, Playing God or Playing Scientist: A Constitutional Analysis of State Laws
Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1354 (1996).
74
Id.
75
Remaley, supra note 58, at 282.
76
Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F.
Supp. 636, 673 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1986); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d. 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995).
71

abort.”77 More specifically, in Margaret S. v. Treen, the court found that because fundamental
rights encompass the entire process surrounding abortion, the prohibition of diagnostic testing
would violate the fundamental rights of women to make reproductive choices.78 However, none
of these decisions have ruled specifically on the use of PGD.

Federal Regulatory Framework
Many believe that the inescapable expenditures of public monies in the direction of
science and technology demand the introduction of a regulatory framework. Generally, medical
procedures are researched and introduced though the NIH. Only after efficacy is established will
procedures find their way into private practices. However, pro-life activists in the United States
have historically campaigned to enforce the ban on federal funding to institutions conducting
research on human embryos or assisted conception.79 Consequently, these procedures are no
longer carried out in governmentally-funded hospitals or universities. Thus, a market-driven,
business oriented approach towards research and treatments for assisted reproduction has
developed.
In addition to privatization, attempts at federal regulation have encountered numerous
hurdles. Since antiabortion sentiments from the Reagan-Bush era led to the abandonment of the
Ethics and Advisory Board in 1979, there have been only limited attempts at federal oversight of
reproductive technologies. Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet criticizes, “this country is
the only country in our technological position that hasn’t, as a society, faced up to the various
social and ethical issues involved in this technology.”80 In 1992, Congress enacted Public Law
102-493 entitled the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act.81 The act called for
clinics to report pregnancy rates to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and for the
establishment of a model program for certifying embryo laboratories.82 The CDC has developed
a set of quality standards that are targeted at assuring the quality of embryo laboratory
procedures. They include laboratory personnel qualifications, record maintenance procedures,
and criteria for the certification and inspection of embryo laboratories.83 However, the model
program is voluntary and has yet to be adopted or implemented by any state.
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Congress

established the Biomedical Ethics Advisory Committee in 1988, and the NIH formed an advisory
panel in 1994 to make recommendations regarding embryo research.84 However, both of these
bodies continued to be hindered by the divide on abortion issues.
The FDA claims authority over human cellular and tissue-based products, which include
embryos, under the authority of section 361 of the Public Health Service (PHS) Act.85 The PHS
Act provides authority to enforce regulations necessary to “prevent the introduction, transmission,
or spread of communicable diseases between the States or from foreign countries into the
States.”86

However, the FDA’s final rule provides an exception for reproductive tissues

establishments that perform only “certain limited activities that raise limited communicable
disease concerns.”87 PGD seems to fall under this exception for establishments that only “recover
reproductive cells or tissue for immediate transfer into a sexually intimate partner of the cell or
tissue donor.”88
With the exception of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act, these
agencies have been advisory in nature. Procedurally, we must consider the establishment of a
separate and independent regulatory agency to review applications for the development and
implementation of new applications of PGD. This agency should apply the principle of placing
the burden of proof of efficacy and safety–in terms of the effects on the children and to society–to
those clinics who wish to offer new techniques of PGD technologies. We must be particularly
careful when attempting to implement this type of technique based legislation that is targeted at a
particular technology (i.e. human cloning), because the line is often drawn to be overly
conservative and may be unconstitutional.

Moreover, broad sweeping legislation is not as

adaptable to changing science and, thus, deals with innovation by halting it.
Examining the governing body implemented in the United Kingdom offers some
guidance in this area. The United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Social Services established a
16-member committee of inquiry in July of 1982, whose primary objective was to address the
problem of relating legislation and morality to the business of assisted reproductive technology.89
The committee issued the Warnock Report in 1984, which called for legislation and led to the
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creation of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in 1990. The HFEA is a
licensing authority that authorizes and regulates clinics that offer assisted reproductive
procedures. The Authority conducts annual inspections of clinics, grants licenses for treatment
services or research, and defines the boundaries beyond which treatment and research must not
venture. The HFEA assures public representation by requiring that half of their members come
from areas of specializations outside of medicine and research.90 These members are recruited
from outside the medical community via newspaper advertisements.91 Their meetings are closed
to the public and only skeletal minutes are published without individual comments.92
The HFEA has set forth training and assessment criteria for laboratories and for
individuals carrying out the embryo biopsy part of the PGD procedure. They require each biopsy
practitioner to be “individually inspected and assessed according to these criteria and their names
registered centrally with the HFEA.”93 The guidelines specify methods of gaining experience and
stipulate demonstrations of proficiency in using FISH and PCR techniques. Moreover, inspectors
and peer reviewers are recruited to evaluate applications to carry out new PGD tests.94 Clinics
cannot perform any other tests or treat any individuals for new disorders without approval.95
Additionally, once practitioners are licensed they are required to submit to annual inspections and
to report the results of their progress.96

Section VI. Building on current regulations
The United States established the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) on
October 7, 1974.97 The goal of the RAC is to “consider the current state of knowledge and
technology regarding recombinant DNA.”98 This includes reviewing human gene transfer trials,
assessing the risks of potential transfer of genetic material to other organisms, and evaluating
hypothetical hazards and methods for monitoring and minimizing risks.99 The composition of
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RAC is very similar to that of the HFEA as approximately one-third of the fifteen members do
not have scientific backgrounds.100
The RAC has enacted guidelines to apply to “all NIH-funded projects involving
recombinant DNA techniques as well as to all non-NIH funded research involving recombinant
DNA techniques conducted at or sponsored by an institution that receives NIH funds for projects
involving such techniques.”101 Therefore, a logical place to implement regulatory authority
seems to exist through expanding the committee’s jurisdiction beyond that of publicly funded
gene therapy to include the review of procedures developed for reproductive purposes. In the
vein of the HFEA, the RAC would be both a rule-making and an adjudicatory authority. Their
function would be to perform accreditation of laboratories and licensing of PGD in relation to
each specific test and condition.
George Annas of Boston University believes that “a meaningful dialogue on such an
important topic can’t be left solely to experts; it needs public deliberation.” A solution that
provides this much-needed element of public transparency would be to establish an institutional
review board (IRB) within the RAC. An IRB could require that every new test to be used and
every new disorder to be tested for be approved in advance. The disorders should be defined
down to the level of each different mutation, and then listed on a license under specific headings.
The screening procedures should only be approved when there can be a compelling
demonstration of a definite benefit to society and to the child. An IRB would place this burden of
proof on parents to show these tests offer an immediate therapeutic benefit to the child and lack
the potential to do significant harm to society. Immediate therapeutic benefits exist where
preventative treatments or early interventions are available, and where these interventions would
be more beneficial than they would be harmful. Accordingly, an IRB could deny access to tests
that do not offer such benefits. Thus, IRB approval would, in effect, take the discretion away
from clinicians–who often have a financial stake in offering new procedures–and place the issue
up for evaluation by an impartial committee.
Developments in equipment and know-how will enable procedures such as IVF and PGD
to be offered to a wider array of individuals. The potential this technology has to eliminate
genetic disease and to extend life will have a substantial impact on future generations.
Policymakers should act with deliberate speed in implementing the necessary substantive and
procedural strategies that are essential to protect future parents and their children.
100

Id.
Amy P. Patterson, M.D., NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules, at http://grants1.nih.gov/grants/policy/recombinentdnaguidelines.htm.

101

© 2002 Jason Christopher Roberts

